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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to verify the introduction of the golden rule of
public finance under an active monetary stance for a less-developed economy
by  evolving  a  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium  framework.  The
simulation  results  have validated  the  presence  of  a  visible  crowding-out  of
private consumption and investment in the short-run and a positive impact of
the productive government spending on long-run growth. In the case of a less-
developed economy that usually has low efficiency and high returns to public
capital, the given factors prove to be significant in addressing the study issue.
Given a goal to offset the debt accumulation burden as a result of increased
public investment financing by persistent output growth in the long-run, the
central bank should not only rely on response to the fluctuation of inflation and
output but also account for a move of public debt.
JEL Classification: O41, H54, E63, E13
Keywords: endogenous growth, golden rule, monetary and fiscal policy, low-
income countries, DSGE modelling.
Introduction
The increased number of crises since the end of the 20th-century has been a
trigger for a new discussion dedicated to effective growth policy. Given the
This is a pre-peer-reviewed version of the paper submitted for publication to Investment
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Government’s role in addressing the negative consequences of the crises that
brought to an increased debt burden, fiscal policy has occupied a central place
in the discussion. In this context, the fiscal regime, as a core element of the
policy framework, ranks first in the debates with a ruling spot of the golden rule
of public finance (GRPF). The rule deals with a public investment that is one of
the driving forces of  growth. The GRPF regime prohibits  from using budget
receipts for public investment financing but allowing for borrowing instead. The
addressed prohibition is significant because the share of capital expenditures is
much smaller than the fraction of current ones. Thus, it is possible to reduce
the  debt  burden  by  taking  advantage  of  high  returns  to  productive  public
capital. In this context, the present paper attempts to verify the introduction of
the  GRPF  regime in  the  framework  of  active  rather  than passive  monetary
policy. The implementation of active monetary policy is crucial because of the
rising  public  debt  as  a  response  to  the  fiscal  expansion  that  is  a  core
impediment in supporting sustainable long-run growth. The ruling mission of
monetary policy under given terms is to decelerate the speed of public debt
accumulation up to the elimination of the excessive borrowing overhand.
The driving forces of public investment are twofold: through fiscal multiplier in
the  short-run,  a  demand-side  effect,  and  through  crowding-in  of  private
investment in the long-run, a supply-side effect. The public debt to GDP ratio is
usually shrinking on behalf of higher output elasticity to budget revenues and
more effective public investment. This efficiency in the way of translating into
productive  infrastructure  is  lower  in  the  less  developed  than  developed
economies. The rational motives are the competitiveness of project selection, a
shortage  of  sound  fiscal  and  legislative  institution  environments,  the  clear
identification of infrastructure needs (Dabla-Norris et al., 2011). If a pressing
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need  for  additional  infrastructure  is  adequately  diversified,  the  public
investment  can  be  more  efficient  in  the  short-run  due  to  an  augmented
demand-side effect mentioned above. The Government authority can make the
right choice in case of small competitive projects with less bureaucracy, tight
cash  flow,  and  diminishing returns  to  additional  capital  (Warner,  2014).  As
confirmed  by  empirical  results,  the  value  of  productive  public  spending  is
usually associated with the capital expenditures that, as opposed to developed
countries,  dominate in less-developed ones by its share in the total  budget
expenditures and by the impact factor (Laboure & Taugourdeau, 2018).
The successful implementation of the GRPF regime is non-common. There were
episodes of the developed countries England and Germany who could not keep
on the rule for a considerable period because of unpredictable impediments.
Apart from a certain high level of productivity, public investment is still difficult
to distinguish correctly from other productive expenditures. The issue of public
capital depreciation and its sources of financing have to be clarified, as well as
other minor inconsistencies of budget assets administration. Given cyclically-
adjusted  net-of-public-investment  deficit,  the  endogenously  limited
accumulation of public investment restrains growth. The short-run crowding-
out of private consumption and investment is also a compelling drawback that
difficult to remove or mitigate without losses in the long-run (Truger, 2015).
There is  a case for the relatively low capital-to-GDP ratio in less-developed
economies where the debt financing of  increased public investment can be
beneficial in supporting long-run growth. The last statement is significant in the
view of a relatively small fiscal space, significant growth potential, and limited
investment capabilities of a less-developed economy (Mintz & Smart, 2006).
Public  investment  has  much  in  common  with  a  well-known  concept  of
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productive government spending. The concept has occupied a regular place
among the up-front issues of the policy debate dedicated to the most effective
driving  forces  of  growth.  Successfully  developed  by  Barro  (1990)  in  the
framework  of  endogenous  growth  theory,  the  concept  of  productive
government spending has been an essential component of the policy agenda in
the  world  economy.  Unlike  unproductive  government  expenditures,  the
productive  ones  have  a  substantive  impact  on  growth  and  account  for  a
relatively  small  fraction  of  the  total  public  spending.  The  advanced
interpretation of productive government spending was addressed by Agénor &
Yilmaz (2011). The scientists analyzed the major component infrastructure but
also  health  and  maintenance  as  productive  ones  of  the  current  budget
expenditures. The research results, among other things, have proved that the
growth  rate  at  a  steady-state  is  higher  if  health,  the  most  productive
component, uses in combination with permission to pay interest by new debt
accumulation. Moreover, it is a distinct crowding-out of private investment in
the short-run, which mitigates and eliminates in the longer term.
The positive impact of productive government spending on growth depends on
many factors.  One of  those  factors  is  sources  of  financing  associated  with
budgetary regimes and the GRPF rule in particular. Concerning the given rule,
the  closing  inference  about  its  performance  is  rather  vague.  Greiner  and
Semmler  (2000)  examined  public  capital  as  a  growth  factor  under  several
budgetary  regimes  related  to  the  GRPF  regime  introduction.  The  general
conclusion of the study has not denied a positive impact of public investment
on growth. The result was productive if the chosen fiscal regime was less strict.
The lower rate of long-run growth in the face of a more strict GRPF regime
(debt interest financed by tax revenue) was due to the impact of the so-called
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internal  crowding-out  effect.  The increasing interest  payment accounted for
this effect that is in line with augmented productive spending.
The value of the GRPF regime was verified by Ghosh & Nolan (2007) in the case
of excessive government consumption. The positive effect of the given regime
was revealed through the rising private consumption and lowering the tax rate,
which brought to higher growth and greater welfare level in the long-run. As
opposed  to  the  mentioned  results,  the  positive  effect  of  the  GRPF  regime
introduction was not confirmed in the long-run but was present in the short-run
according  to  the  research  of  Minea  and  Villieu  (2009).  Applying  cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint, the authors have shown up that the positive outcome
of additional public capital  mobilization is overlapped by the future raise of
taxes  to  cover  increased  debt  maturity.  Subject  to  chosen  condition,  the
expected budget deficit is a matter of tax financing in the long-run, as well as a
lower  level  of  growth.  The other  results  obtained  by  Groneck  (2011)  have
confirmed the positive impact of public investments on growth under the GRPF
regime  that  allows  for  servicing  debt  obligations  by  adjusting  public
consumption. The work emphasized that the magnitude of the positive welfare
effect  depends on  the  amount  of  public  consumption that  has to  equal  or
surpass a social optimum.
The debt threshold and the rate of its maturity are also crucial points of the
GRPF study. Kellermann (2007) has correctly pointed out that the introduction
of the GRPF regime does not guarantee a long-run growth if the social rate of
time preferences is lower than the rate of debt maturity. Yakita (2008) has
shown up that the debt threshold is a crucial point in keeping on the ratio of
the public capital and debt to GDP. The author has demonstrated in a series of
simulation  results  that,  if  surpassing  the  threshold,  the  economy  no  more
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returns to a baseline scenario, and the budget deficit restriction violates.
It worth noted that only a minor number of papers dedicated to the GRPF study
pays due attention to the stance of monetary policy, whose impact may be of
great importance considering the interplay between fiscal and monetary policy.
The  high  performance  of  active  monetary  stance  compared  to  passive
accommodation in reaction to fiscal expansion is proved by Gali et al. (2007)
and Malik (2013). The recent study of Zeyneloglu (2018) has had an essential
contribution to the GRPF topic by integrating active monetary policy as well.
The work has confirmed that the GRPF rule may be one of the significant terms
to obtain a positive impact on output as a result of public spending shock in the
case of a developed economy.
Given  a  shortage  of  due  attention  that  the  academic  community  pays  to
monetary policy stance in the GRPF study, the goal of the present paper is to
explore  the  endogenous  growth  of  a  less-developed  economy  under  a
combination of the GRPF regime and active monetary policy. To pursue the
goal,  we built  a well-defined dynamic stochastic general  equilibrium (DSGE)
model to simulate a response to positive fiscal expansion shock. The research
has validated the presence of notable crowding-out of private consumption and
investment in the short-run and the positive impact of productive government
spending  on  long-run  growth.  The  study  results  are  robust  in  terms  of
sufficiently high efficiency and productivity of public investment and strictness
of Taylor rule responsiveness to public debt move.
The  paper  has  a  forthcoming  structure.  Following  the  introduction,  we
demonstrate the model building in detail and then laid out the calibration data
and simulation results with concluding remarks.
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The Model
The submitted small-scale model reproduces a closed less-developed economy
in  the  endogenous  setting.  We  develop  an  endogenous  setting  under  the
interplay of the GRPF regime and active monetary policy. Generally speaking,
the model is a stylized New Keynesian DSGE framework with the incorporation
of welfare-enhancing government purchases, deep habit formation, and real
money holdings in the utility-generating function as well as a modified Taylor
rule. Besides the lagged interest rate, inflation, and output, the given rule also
includes a response to the public debt-to-output ratio. There are two rigidities
in the model, real rigidity is the deep habit formation, and nominal rigidity is
Calvo-style  price  stickiness.  The model  structure  comprises  three economic
agents:  households,  firms,  and  the  government.  Fiscal  and  monetary
authorities  are  components  of  government  agents  that  follow  a  specific
administration  regime  that  is  a  combination  of  GRPF  and  active  monetary
policy.  We  incorporate  price  stickiness  that,  in  a  world  of  monopolistically
competitive firms, violates the principle of neutrality of money balances.
Households
The  economy  is  populated  by  a  continuum  of  identical  infinitely-lived
households  on  the  interval  [0,1].  The  households  maximize  their  expected
lifetime utility, which is a combination of logarithmic function and a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) aggregation additively separable in consumption,
real  money  balances,  Mt/Pt,  and  labour  supply,  Lt.  In  each  period,  the
representative  household  is  endowed  with  one unit  of  time that  is  divided
between  labour  and  leisure,  that  is  why  the  labour  supply  is  negatively
introduced  into  the  utility  function.  The  consumption  has  an  aggregate
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effective form and consists of private consumption in the current period,  CPt,
the same variable, but in the lagged period, CPt-1, which is an element of habit
formation,  and  the  so-called  “utility-generating”  or  “welfare-enhancing”
government  purchases,  CGt.  This  portion  of  purchases  granting  by  the
government takes its origin from the assumption that public consumption in
such a way can move the private agents’ marginal utility of consumption. The
degree of external habit formation, h, and the elasticity of substitution between
the private and government consumption, ф, are indexed by [0,1]. Hence, the
representative  household  maximizes  the  expected  discounted  value  of  the
lifetime utility function:
, (1)
where β [0,1] is the parameter corresponds to subjective discount factor, φ >
0 is the inverse of  the Frisch elasticity of  labour supply, and  χM and  χL are
positive numbers fixing the steady-state utility  of  real  money balances and
labour supply, respectively.
Suggested by Ravn et  al.  (2006),  “Joneses  good-by-good” or  “deep habits”
description  of  preferences  becomes  vastly  applied  in  the  modern  DSGE
literature,  and  the  alternative  known  as  the  utility-generating  government
purchases is one that uses in the model. The detailed comparative analysis of
the  different  consumption  specifications  that  include  habit  formation  is
presented by Havranek et al. (2017). Given the public investment impact on
growth, Leeper et al. (2010) successfully employed the specification of deep
habit  formation  in  the  utility-generating  function  to  examine  the
implementation delays and distorting fiscal adjustments in the short- and long-
run.
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The introduction of government spending in the utility-generating function with
a substitution effect in a simple form is applied, for example, by Christiano &
Eichenbaum (1992).  The more combined form of  the government  spending
aggregation in the structure of utility function, namely CES specification with
deep habit formation, was explored by Ercolani and Azevedo (2018). We take
the case that the government purchases crowding out private consumption by
choosing  ф [0,1]. As government consumption substitutes for a private one,
the marginal utility of consumption is shifting. The idea for incorporating the
welfare-enhancing government purchases inseparably in the structure of utility
function as well as a component of aggregate effective consumption together
with deep habit formation is an intention to adopt some empirical evidence
verified in the above works, but for developed economies. As shown by the
following simulation results and sensitivity analysis, these settings contribute
to mitigating a crowding-out effect in the short-run and strengthening growth in
the long-run.
All households divided into two fractions, intertemporal or Ricardian and “rule-
of-thumb” or non-Ricardian. The first fraction (1-η) behaves as forward-looking
optimizers that, by having access to financial markets, accumulate and rent out
capital  to  firms  and  holds  government  bonds.  The  second  fraction  (η)  is
myopically acting customers that consume all of their current labour income
without making any far-seeing economic decisions. Apart from this, the labour
market is competitive, wages are equal across all households, and both types
of households work the same number of hours.
Ricardian households consume private goods,  CPt, gain welfare from keeping
real  money-holdings in the current and previous periods,  (Mt-Mt-1)/Pt,  access
financial  market  by  holding  riskless  government  bonds  in  real  terms
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(denominated in a composite consumption good) each period under no-Ponzy-
game condition, Bt/Pt, plus obtaining benefit in a form of past-term real interest,
it-1, charge real interest,  rt, on past-period capital accumulation,  KPt-1, invest in
production  of  goods,  IPt,  and  pay  lump-sum taxes  (in  a  consumption  good
equivalent),  Tt.  The households’ budget is equal in each period, and in real
terms corresponds to the constraint:
(2)
The infinite-horizon Ricardian households are endowed with capital,  KPt, used
for the production of goods, and, considering the depreciation rate δ [0,1], the
law of motion for private capital follows the rule:
, (3)
The  intertemporal  consumer  maximizes  (1)  by  choosing  the  sequence
subject  to  (2)  and  (3).  The  gross  rate  of  inflation
corresponds to the ratio . Applying with a little algebra the first-order-
condition (FOC) and eliminating the multiplier, obtain:
The Euler equation:
(4)
The labour supply equation:
(5)
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The benefits of investment linked to capital accumulation:
(6)
Being  liquidity-constrained,  the  non-Ricardian  households  consume  all  the
disposable income each period. So, their budget constraint is:
(7)
The  “rule-of-thumb”  consumers  maximize  (1)  by  choosing  the  sequence
subject to (7).  By employing the FOC and dropping the multiplier,
have:
(8)
Concluding the optimization process and taking a closer look at equation (4),
we can constitute that the marginal utility of private consumption equals the
marginal utility of real money balances. That contradicts a conception of the
Keynesian theory that is a positive correlation between money demand and
gross  income.  According  to  a  widespread  view,  real  money  balances  are
specific welfare that provides a saving on transaction costs by increasing time
for leisure and reducing time for goods purchase. In developing this view, we
follow Ganelli (2003) and assume that households can partially substitute the
total  efficient consumption to real  money balances if  the marginal utility of
private consumption diminishes. That is why under the given utility function
setup, the relationship between aggregate effective consumption and money
demand is positive. Given welfare-enhancing government purchases, there is
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also a positive correlation between money demand and public spending. As a
result of fiscal expansion, the change in the steady-state utility of real money
balances  positively  correlates  with  output  growth,  which  is  verified  in  the
sensitivity analysis at the end of this paper. That confirms an assumption about
the motivation of households who shift their benefits for real money balances if
the marginal utility of private consumption diminishes.
Firms
There are two kinds of firms that do their operations on wholesale and retail
markets.  The  final  goods  producers,  which  are  entirely  identical,  sell  their
products in the retail market that is a perfectly competitive one. The retailer
buys a large variety of wholesale goods Yt(j), for j [0,1], and transforms them,
according  to  a  Dixit-Stiglitz  aggregator  with  the  elasticity  of  substitution
between wholesale goods, ω > 1, into a bundle of goods Yt as follows:
(9)
Optimizing  the  profit  maximization,  we  have  the  demand  function  of  the
intermediate goods:
(10)
Merging (9) and (10) gives the expression of final goods price:
(11)
The intermediate goods sector consists of a large number of monopolistically
competitive  firms  that  produce  differentiable  goods.  The  wholesale  firms
decide the price and the number of factor endowments using the Cobb-Douglas
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production  function.  The  function  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale  to  the
private production inputs of private capital, KPt-1, and labour force, Lt, which is a
necessary prerequisite in the structure of the endogenous growth setting. By
additionally  incorporating  the  aggregate  public  capital,  KGt-1,  the  production
function  displays  increasing  returns  to  scale  (Glomm  &  Ravikumar,  1997;
Leeper et al., 2010). Concerning all components, the elasticity of output are
positive numbers, and, for maintaining a balanced growth path, we assume
that  α +  αG <  1  (Turnovsky,  2004).  So,  the  production  function  has  the
following specification:
(12)
Considering  prices  for  factor  endowments,  the  retailer  fixes  the  volume  of
capital and labour for minimizing the total production cost, which brings to the
following capital/labour trade-off:
(13)
Allowing for the symmetry in the technology of firms, all agents are identical,
so  we  eliminate  the  j subscript.  Expressing  the  total  cost  by  rearranging
equation (13) in terms of the factor endowments of production function and
taking derivative to output, yields the description of marginal consumption:
(14)
The wholesale firms have a market power of price setters according to the
Calvo rule. In each period t, a randomly selected fraction of firms (1- ) adjusts
its  prices  for  obtaining  the  highest  discounted  value  of  current  and  future
13
profits.  The rest  firms of  fraction   follow a stickiness rule  by keeping the
prices of the previous period. Applying FOC to get the highest market value of
goods  at  adjusted  prices  compared  to  the  total  cost  and  considering  the
demand function (10) gives the optimal price level for the (1- ) firms:
(15)
Combining the optimal price index with one that is in line with stickiness rule
yields the aggregate price level:
(16)
Fiscal Authority
The Government finances public investment,  IGt, public consumption,  CGt, and
repayment  of  the  interest  along with  the  principal  of  the  public  debt.  The
sources of financing are lump-sum taxes,  Tt, one-period real bonds, Bt/Pt, and
seigniorage,  which  is  the  revenue  of  money  creation  expressed  by  the
difference  of  real  money  balances  of  the  current  and  previous  periods.  In
reality, the Government issues bonds of different maturities. For ease of math,
we assumed that  all  bonds are issued to mature at the end of  the period.
Taking the above interpretation, the fiscal authority budget constraint compiled
in real terms is as follows:
(17)
Following  Shen  et  al.  (2018),  we  assume that  investment  efficiency  is  not
perfect, which is actual for a less-developed economy. In connection with this,
the one currency unit  of  investment expenditure can deliver  less  than one
currency unit of public capital. Considering the marginal efficiency applied to
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the public investment expenditure, 0 <  ε < 1, the law of motion for public
capital is:
(18)
By general assumption, public spending is divided into public consumption and
public investment. Accepting the suggested by Groneck (2011) and Zeyneloglu
(2018) terms, the public spending distributes as follows:
, (19)
, (20)
where  υ is  the  steady-state  ratio  of  public  investment  to  the  entire  public
spending,  and  k >  1  is  the  measure  of  augmenting  the  share  of  public
investment  in  the  allocation  of  entire  public  spending.  The  latter  is  an
imperative  prerequisite  for  implementing  the  GRPF  regime  in  the  model
specification. Thus, the share of public investment can surpass the steady-state
level, assuming public debt as the source of financing as well as seigniorage.
Tax revenues are apportioned between public investment, public consumption,
and repayment  of  the  interest  of  the  public  debt.  According to  Zeyneloglu
(2018) and following the GRPF regime, we allow financing public investment at
the  expense  of  the  budget  revenue,  but  only  to  a  minor  extent,  which
corresponds to the parameter 0 <σ <1. Thus, the distribution of tax revenues
meets the specification:
(21)
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Monetary Authority
The current  endogenous installation introduces nominal rigidity  and money.
With this in mind, the monetary authority becomes one of the decision-making
agents. While the fiscal policy associates with the GRPF regime, the monetary
policy follows a Taylor rule. We employ alternative to Taylor rule specification
suggested by Zeyneloglu (2018) that, apart from the response to the inflation
and output deviations from the steady-state, also accounts for the public debt-
to-output ratio motion examined by Kumhof et al. (2010):
, (22)
where  iNt is nominal interest rate,  ρi,  ρ ,  ρY, and ρB are positive parameters,
that  measure  a  degree  of  reaction  to  deviations  from the  steady  state  of
nominal  interest  rate,  inflation,  output,  and  the  public  debt-to-GDP  ratio,
respectively  (apart  from  the  others,  which  are  in  the  range  of  (0,1),  the
parameter ρ  > 1 to satisfy Taylor principle and be consistent with an active
monetary policy).
In addition to smoothing parameter ρi, the effective interest rate policy ensures
that the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables, such as aggregate price
level,  output,  and public debt,  are among the priorities of  the central  bank
activity.  Allowing for  public  debt  dynamic is  a necessary component of  the
interest rate adjustment tool since the GRPF regime has much to do with an
increased  debt  burden,  which  should  be  taken  into  account  in  the
implementation of monetary policy. Thus, the cooperation between fiscal and
monetary authorities in the case of the combination of the GRPF regime and
Taylor rule comes to the fore in the presented model structure.
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Equilibrium and aggregation
In equilibrium, the goods market clearing condition is:
(23)
The model includes a violation related to the shock of public spending. The
violation  reproduces  a  typical  AR(1)  process  including  the  degree  of
autoregression persistence, κ < 1, and a stochastic component :
(24)
Taking  into  account  the  presence  of  the  intertemporal  and  rule-of-thumb
households, the aggregate private consumption and labour supply interpolated
as:
(25)
(26)
Given  the  choice  variables  ,  policy  instruments
,  and  the  sequence  of  prices ,  the  equilibrium
conforms the system of equations:
− the Ricardian households’  budget  constraint  (2)  and optimality  conditions
(4)-(6);
− the non-Ricardian households’ budget constraint (7) and optimality condition
(8);
− the firms’ optimality conditions (13) and (14), and the production function
(12);
− the optimal (15) and general (16) price levels;
− the law of motion for private (3) and public capital (18);
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− the fiscal authority’s budget constraint (17), policy decisions (19)-(21), and
shock description (24);
− the monetary authority’s policy rule (22);
− the aggregates of private consumption (25) and labour supply (26);
− the benchmark equilibrium values.
Calibration
The purpose of  developing the DSGE endogenous model  is  to generate the
impulse responses of the key macro variables to the public spending positive
shock  and  establish  the  most  crucial  parameters  which  address  the  GRPF
regime’s performance in cooperation with active monetary policy. If we take
the system of the above 21 equations, there is no analytical solution, so we use
the numerical  method. The method comprises the calibration of  benchmark
equilibrium values with a subsequent log-linearization procedure around the
zero-inflation steady-state. To perform the following simulation procedure, we
use the Octave software together with Dynare add-on.
The unit of time observation is a quarter. The discount factor is set to  β =
0.9314,  implying  the  annualized  real  interest  rate  of  around  8%.  In  the
premium works  concerning  DSGE  modelling  for  developing  economies,  the
given real interest rate is in the range of 6%-10%, and we chose the medium
value. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply φ is equal 2, which is
in the array of values used in calibration for the majority of economies from
developed  to  less-developed  ones.  The degree  of  private  consumer’s  habit
formation,  h,  varies  considerably  from  0.1  to  0.9  and  depends  on  the
micro/macro foundation of the estimation procedure, the frequency of the data,
the precautionary saving motive, the country region, and the openness of an
economy (Havranek et al., 2017). We set the given parameter to 0.7, which
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corresponds to the value adopted by Ercolani & Azevedo (2018). The paper,
along with other things, examined an aggregate effective form of consumption,
formally  CES  specification,  which  adopted  in  a  simpler  specification  in  the
present work.
The  analytical  research  contributed  to  the  estimation  of  the  elasticity  of
substitution between private and government consumption has marked up the
value from negative -1.76 to positive 1.66 (Kwan, 2006). The other work has
tested the given parameter for 24 African countries and came to the conclusion
the estimated pooled (average) value was 0.586 (Dawood & Francois, 2018). In
the case of 15 EU member countries, the average intertemporal elasticity of
substitution proved to be around 0.4 (Auteri & Costantini, 2010). Assuming a
moderate disposition concerning a less-developed economy, we fix the degree
of elasticity substitution between private and government consumption at 0.3.
The steady-state disutility of labour supply is set to  χL = 0.3, which does not
vary substantially in the DSGE structure and is consistent with steady-state
labour hours (about 8 hours spent at work per day). Davig & Leeper (2011)
suggested the steady-state utility of real money balances for the USA economy
to be 0.4,  which corresponds to the inverse of  the average monetary base
velocity.  The  calibrated  value  has  to  be  adjusted  in  the  way  a  developed
economy differs from a less-developed one. Since the monetary base velocity
is an indicator that changes considerably and depends on many factors, we
accept the same parameter value χM = 0.4.
There are a few parameters we reproduce as they were in the paper of Malik
(2013). The linear term in the utilization cost function is set to δ = 0.025 per
quarter, which implies a steady-state annualized depreciation rate of 10%. The
private capital income share of total output is set to α = 1/3. The elasticity of
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substitution between a variety of  goods is set to  ω = 6,  so a steady-state
markup in the goods market is 20 percent. The fraction of firms that keep their
prices unchanged, , is given a baseline value of 0.75, which corresponds to
an average price duration of one year.
The output elasticity to productive government spending is one of the crucial
parameters  of  the  presented  work.  In  the  matching  study  literature  that
explores mainly advanced economies, the given parameter fluctuates greatly
from a relatively large value 0.4 (Pereira & de Frutos, 1999), to even a small
negative value (Evans & Karras, 1994). At the same time, the productivity of
public  capital  in  low-income  countries  concerning  the  spending  on
infrastructure is rated to 0.25 by Shen et al. (2018). Given that in the case of a
less-developed economy with the possibility of rendering higher productivity of
public capital, especially in infrastructure terms, we assume that the elasticity
of production to productive government expenditures αG is 0.22.
Fixing the efficiency of public investment, we follow the results obtained by
Dabla-Norris  et  al.  (2011).  The  authors  have  built  the  index  of  public
investment efficiency for 71 developing economies that reached on average
0.8. The other study related to the topic took the lower values corresponding to
the range of 0.2-0.6 (Shen et al., 2018). We assume the marked parameter is
0.6  providing  the  upper  value  in  the  given  range  of  the  verified  public
investment efficiency.
The  share  of  the  rule-of-thumb  consumers  differs  considerably  among  the
DSGE study literature. There is a common practice to set a higher value if a
developing economy is a matter of study. In the paper of Shen et al. (2018),
the given parameter fixed at 0.75 for low-income countries. In the case of non-
EMU Central and Eastern European counties, the percentage of total population
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unable to  face unexpected financial  expenses varied from 36 in the Czech
Republic to 72.2 in Hungary (Krajewski, 2017). We make a rather compromise
decision, and set the share of non-Ricardian households to η = 0.6.
The policy block is composed of the fiscal and monetary parameters. We follow
Groneck  (2011)  and  Zeyneloglu  (2018)  by  fixing  the  share  of  tax-financed
public  investment  and  the  distribution  of  public  spending  in  favour  of
investment to 0.1 and 1.3, respectively. We set the size of the response of the
monetary authority to inflation,  ρ , to 1.5, as in Zeyneloglu (2018), a value
that  satisfies  the  so-called  Taylor  principle.  The  other  monetary  policy
parameters except for the response of interest rate to public debt are also the
same as in Zeyneloglu (2018). Thus, the persistence of interest rate, ρi, and the
response of interest rate to output, ρY, are 0.6 and 0.1, respectively. Given the
similar  specification  of  the  modified  Taylor  rule  applied  for  the  Pakistan
economy by Shahid et al.  (2016),  we take the response of  interest  rate to
public debt, ρB, in the same range but a slightly lower value of 0.01.
The initial public debt and public spending to output ratios are evaluated by
referring to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database and the IMF's Fiscal
Monitor  periodic  publication.  According  to  the  publication,  the  general
government expenditure and gross debt measured in percent of GDP in the row
of 40 low-income developing countries for 2018 are amounted to on average
0.19  and 0.45,  respectively.  Rounding-off  and  slightly  adjusting,  we fix  the
marked  parameters  at  0.3  and  0.4,  respectively.  We  consider  another
publication, “Government at a glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2017”,
and fix the initial public investment to the entire public spending ratio, which is
set to υ = 0.08. The initial value of money velocity, Y/M, is located at 1/0.3, and
the persistency of government spending shock, κ, is set to 0.75.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor
0.931
4
h Degree of private consumer’s habit formation 0.7
ф
Elasticity of substitution between private and 
government consumption
0.3
χM Steady-state utility of real money balances 0.4
χL Steady-state disutility of labour supply 0.3
φ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply 2
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
α Private capital income share of output 1/3
αG Output elasticity to productive government spending 0.22
ε Efficiency of public investment 0.6
ω Elasticity of substitution between wholesale goods 6
Degree of price stickiness 0.75
η Share of rule-of-thumb consumers 0.6
σ Share of tax-financed public investment 0.1
k Distribution of public spending in favour of investment 1.3
ρi Persistence of interest rate 0.6
ρ Response of interest rate to inflation 1.5
ρY Response of interest rate to output 0.1
ρB Response of interest rate to public debt 0.01
υ
Initial public investment to the entire public spending 
ratio
0.08
G/Y Initial public spending-to-output ratio 0.3
B/Y Initial public debt-to-output ratio 0.4
Y/M Initial money velocity 1/0.3
κ Degree of autoregressive shock 0.75
Simulation results
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The  impulse  responses  of  the  key  macro  variables  to  the  public  spending
positive shock are generated using the elaborated DSGE framework that  is
calibrated for monitoring a less-developed economy at a quarterly frequency.
The  timeline  covers  40  quarters  corresponding  to  10  years.  The  impulse
responses are measured  in  percent  deviations  from the steady states.  The
shock parameter of the rise in public spending, , is 1 percentage point. The
simulation results  demonstrate that  the dynamics  of  output  remains in  the
positive domain of values keeping the long-run growth around 0.6 percentage
point  higher  than  the  steady-state  (Fig.  1).  There  is  evidence  of  visible
crowding-out of private consumption and investment that gradually vanishes at
the end of the second year. The presence of the crowding-out effect in the
short-run is consistent with the results reported in several studies, for example,
Gali  et al.  (2007),  Malik (2013),  and Zeyneloglu (2018).  As exhibited in the
given works, the results may differ in terms of fiscal policy regime and the
sources of budget deficit financing as well as calibrating the parameters that
modulate the welfare effect and a degree of rigidities in the model structure.
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Figure 1: The response of the key macro variables to public spending
shock
The simulation results demonstrate that the given terms related to crowding-
out effect are still sound if we take into account a predominate share of “rule-
of-thumb”  consumers,  0.6  to  be  exact.  The  presence  of  Non-Ricardian
households  contributes  to  the  crowding-in  effect  instead.  They consume all
available income, not having any bias for future decisions. That contradicts the
mission  of  Ricardian  consumers  who  are  responsible  for  the  crowding-out
effect. Ricardian consumers restrain their consumption needs due to excessive
public spending. Their decision is motivated by the following inevitable fiscal
restriction  that  the  government  is  going  to  implement  to  compensate  the
excessive  public  spending.  Pessimistic  expectations  generate  a  negative
wealth effect that brings to the crowding-out effect in the short-run. As proved
by the simulation results, between the two representative agents, the finale
score settles by Ricardian households, and the crowding-out remains audible
even  if  we  allow  for  a  non-separable  aggregate  consumption.  The  given
aggregation involves a substitution between private and public consumption in
conjunction with a deep habit formation in the utility function specification. It
worth emphasizing that the obtained short-run results are different from the
long-run ones.
Public spending expansion leads to a reduction in the marginal utility of private
consumption  through  increased  tax  pressure.  Given  the  structure  of  the
presented model, the fiscal strain is partly dampened because of the public
investment  component  financed  by  debt  accumulation.  The  incorporated
element  of  habit  formation  also  contributes  to  smoothing  a  downward
dynamics of private consumption. Ravn et al. (2006) have demonstrated that
the deep habit formation is of great value to ensure co-movement between
private consumption and aggregate demand in response to public spending
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shock, which is in line with empirical evidence, in such a case, for the USA
economy.  The  substitution  of  private  consumption  for  a  public  one  in  the
aggregate  consumption  specification  induces  the  households  to  temporarily
shift  their  priorities  in  favour  of  welfare-enhancing  government  purchases,
which  additionally  reduces  the  pressure  of  fiscal  shock.  The  intertemporal
decision of Ricardian consumers leads to contracting aggregate demand that
motivates firms to be less competitive (Ercolani & Azevedo, 2018). The lower
aggregate demand translates into the supply side because of the presence of
nominal  rigidities.  It  is  worth  noting  that  nominal  price  rigidity  plays  a
significant role in supporting higher demand over time. Gali et al. (2007) have
correctly pointed out that the introduction of price rigidity has to be taken into
account in interconnection with the presence of “rule-of-thumb” consumers to
raise aggregate consumption in response to positive public spending shock.
That is because sticky prices can retain a real wage in case of shrinking the
marginal  product  of  labour,  which  is  consistent  with  empirical  evidence.
Asimakopoulos et al. (2016) have also emphasized the vital place of nominal
price rigidity but together with productive government expenditures, which are
key  factors  to  provide  a  positive  impact  of  increasing  public  spending  on
private consumption.
The simulation results have shown that the indicated crowding-out effect leads
to a reduction in private capital, which is quite noticeable for up to two years.
The accumulation of private capital  has hardly restored half the contraction
from the initial position at the end of the observed timeline. On the contrary,
given persistent  long-run  growth,  the  resulting drift  of  private  consumption
goes beyond its steady-state and retains the level by five percentage points
higher.  The long-run private investment also  restores  its  initial  position but
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without gaining additional score. The similar dynamic of private investment as
a response to public spending shock has been outlined by Gali et al. (2007),
Malik (2013), Zeyneloglu (2018), and Shen et al. (2018). Of the four mentioned,
the  last  paper  examined low-income countries  that  are  not  popular  among
research  dedicated  to  the  given  topic.  All  addressed  works  pertained  to  a
passive fiscal  policy and a more simplified Taylor rule that did not follow a
public debt move. It should be noted that a synchronous adaptation of passive
fiscal and active monetary policy to the public debt movement is a strict rule
for  the  economy to  have  an  adequate  degree  of  autonomy.  Bear  in  mind
productive  public  spending  incorporated  in  the  production  function  of
wholesale firms, the role of government can be more vital in accelerating long-
run  growth  thanks  to  crowding-in  effect.  Concerning  productive  public
spending,  the  efficiency  and  productivity  of  public  capital  are  of  great
importance, first and foremost, for a less-developed economy. That is because
such an economy usually has low efficiency but high returns to public capital.
Public debt growth proves to be more aggressive in the first year, moving up to
almost 25 percentage points higher than its steady-state value. Considering
persistent long-run growth, the burden of debt mitigates and gradually reaches
the  initial  level.  That  is  a  significant  result,  which  is  that  over  time,  the
crowding-out effect is balancing. The nominal interest rate reaction to the fiscal
shock is augmented by the growing demand from the public sector for financial
assets.  The  growing  debt  is  one  of  the  primary  factors  of  the  accelerated
interest rate dynamic that is still visible following two years of volatility and
decelerates slightly in the long run up to 6 percentage points higher than its
steady-state.
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It is challenging to follow an accommodative monetary policy in the case of
persistent  fiscal  expansion  without  the  negative  consequences  of  inflation
impact. The aggregate price level has another reason for moving up. It is due
to the so-called intra-temporal substitution effect that is introduced by Davig &
Leeper  (2011).  Driven  by  the  positive  shock  of  government  spending,  the
increased demand for labour raises real wages and encourages households to
work harder. In doing so, households consume less for leisure. The increased
real  wages  put  pressure  on  the  aggregate  price  level  due  to  an  adequate
increase in firms’ marginal costs.
It is a case of the so-called “divine coincidence” if output and an aggregate
price  level  go up  in  one direction  in  response to  positive  fiscal  shock.  We
assume an active monetary policy to restrain the pressure of inflation. Given
the modified Taylor rule by which the central bank monitors not only inflation
and output gap but also keeps an eye on public debt dynamic, the nominal
interest rate is going to be a ruling instrument of price stability. The short-run
fiscal demand puts pressure on the aggregate price level forcing the monetary
authority to raise the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one, resulting in
a  rapid  reduction  of  inflation.  Davig  &  Leeper  (2011)  described  the  given
repercussion by introducing the term of the inter-temporal substitution effect.
As the crowding-out effect becomes moderate and the influence of debt burden
mitigates, the inflation dynamic restores zero steady-state. Malik (2013) has
come to  similar  autonomy over  inflation,  emphasizing, among other  things,
that  seigniorage  plays  a  minor  role,  as  price  dynamic  remains  relatively
subdued  over  the  visible  timescale.  Antunes  &  Ercolani  (2019)  has  also
obtained similar results by simulating public debt growth to finance increased
government purchases. Besides, the authors have stressed a negative wealth
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effect in the short-run.The performed sensitivity analysis has proved that the
growth response to the fiscal shock, together with a shift in the response of the
interest rate to the public debt-to-output ratio motion, ρB, reiterates non-linear
dynamics demonstrating a visible overload in the long-run. Unlike output, the
public debt dynamic is quite the opposite, which does not change since coming
down to the steady-state.
What is  important,  the output  overload position matches the initial  level  of
public  debt,  which  corresponds  to  the  value  of  the  parameter  ρB =  0.01.
Therefore, there is no need for a more severe debt restriction as production
moves to the upper limit (Fig. 2). Concluding the simulation results, we can
constitute  that  under  accepted
fiscal-monetary regime, the public
spending expansion is a negative
step  in  maintaining  short-run
growth but has a substantial long-
run value.
Conclusion
It has been an attempt in the present work to verify the introduction of the
GRPF regime under a well-defined fiscal-monetary stance for a less-developed
economy by employing a proper DSGE framework. There are several notable
features of the given framework that distinguish it from the models used in the
papers related to the GRPF study. Besides the two rigidities, namely a deep
habit formation and Calvo-style price stickiness,  the current DSGE structure
includes real money holdings and welfare-enhancing government purchases in
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Figure 2: The response of output and
public debt to public spending shock:
sensitivity to parameter ρB
the  utility-generating  function  as  well  as  a  modified  Taylor  rule.  By
incorporating the  above settings,  the  general  idea was  to  adopt  consistent
empirical evidence that contributes to mitigating a crowding-out effect in the
short-run and strengthening growth in the long-run. The mentioned modified
Taylor rule, apart from the response to the inflation and output deviations from
the  steady-state,  also  accounts  for  a  debt-to-output  ratio  motion.  The
incorporation of such a parameter to the Taylor rule is significant because the
given  composition  makes  it  possible  to  dampen  an  increasing  public  debt
burden more persistently.
The simulation results obtained as a response to public spending expansion
demonstrate that the dynamics of output remains in a positive domain of long-
run  growth.  There  is  a  visible  crowding-out  of  private  consumption  and
investment  in  the short-run.  The indicated crowding-out  effect  leads to  the
reduction in private capital, whose accumulation has hardly restored half the
contraction from the initial position at the end of the observed timeline. On the
contrary,  given  persistent  long-run  growth,  the  resulting  drift  of  private
consumption  goes  slightly  beyond  its  steady-state.  The  long-run  private
investment also restores its initial position but without gaining additional score.
The nominal interest rate reaction to the fiscal  shock is  augmented by the
growing demand from the public sector for financial assets. As a response to
fiscal expansion, public debt growth proves to be more aggressive in the short-
run.  Considering persistent  long-run growth,  the debt  burden mitigates  and
gradually reaches the initial level. That is a significant result, which is that over
time, the crowding-out effect is balancing.
The simulation results are robust in terms of a share of liquidity-constrained
households, a relatively high degree of price stickiness, as well as efficiency
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and  productivity  of  public  investment.  The  last  two  factors  are  significant
because, in the case of a less-developed economy, a low efficiency and high
returns to public capital distinguish such an economy from others. What is also
important,  to  succeed  in  the  GRPF  regime  introduction  under  the  active
monetary stance, the central  bank has to rely not only on response to the
inflation and output deviations from the steady-state but also accounts for a
move of public debt.
In further research, the foreign sector has to be taken into consideration in the
context  of  the  external  sources  of  budget  deficit  financing  as  well  as  the
exchange rate dynamic, considering their contribution to growth due to fiscal
and monetary transmission channels.
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